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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is before this Court pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The policy issued by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Bear
River") to David and Deanna Williams (hereinafter "Williams") specifically excludes
coverages for damages caused by vandalism and malicious mischief when property has been
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the
trial court correctly determined that since Williams' home had been vacant for more than
thirty consecutive days prior to the loss, the loss was a result of vandalism and malicious
mischief, which was excluded by Bear River's policy.
As to the standard of review, the appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Williams also contend there is an issue as to whether the trial court correctly
determined that there were no issues of disputed fact precluding the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Bear River. Williams did not identify this issue in their Rule 9
Docketing Statement, as they were required to do and, therefore, the Court should not
consider this issue. However, in the event the Court decides to consider such, Bear River has
addressed this issue in the Argument section below.
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Williams address an additional argument Bear River presented in its Motion for
Summary Judgment in the trial court below that there is no coverage afforded by the Bear
River policy because the vacant Williams house was not being used for dwelling purposes
at the time the fire occurred. However, that argument was not a basis of the trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Bear River and, consequently, is not an issue
on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Bear River filed a declaratory action with the trial court, asking
the court to declare that there is no coverage for damage done to property owned by the
Williams because: (1) the damage to the Williams' property was caused by an act of
vandalism and malicious mischief while the property had been vacant for more than 30
consecutive days; and (2) at the time of the loss the property was not being used principally
for dwelling purposes as required by the policy.
Course of Proceedings and its Disposition in the Trial Court: At the conclusion
of discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted
Bear River's motion for summary judgment and denied Williams' motion for summary
judgment. (See Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bear River, attached hereto
as Addendum A.) Williams now appeal the trial court's decision granting Bear River's
motion for summary judgment.
Facts of the Case: Bear River issued a Homeowners Insurance Property policy to

2

Williams for property they owned at 1163 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(hereinafter referred to as the "Williams property".) (See Applicable Insurance Policy,
Addendum B, R. 8-29.)
The policy extends coverage to the Williams' property subject to the terms,
conditions, limitations, restrictions and exclusions listed in the policy. (See Applicable
Insurance Policy, p. 1, Addendum B, R. 8-29.)
The policy contains a provision that excludes coverage for damage to the Williams
property if the damage is a result of an act of vandalism and malicious mischief when the
Williams' property has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days before the loss.
(See Applicable Insurance Policy, Addendum B, p. 4, R. 12.)
The Williams, at all relevant times, were and are owners of the Williams property.
(See Williams' Answer to Declaratory Complaint, ^ 3, R. 33.) The Williams property was
used as a rental property by the Williamses until August 2002. (See Williams' Answer to
Declaratory Complaint, If 18 R. 34.) However, from August 2002 to July 3, 2003, the
Williams property was vacant and the windows and doors were boarded up. (See Williams'
Answer to Declaratory Complaint, % 19, R. 34; David Williams Deposition, p. 39,11. 18-21,
p. 43,11. 21-23, p.44,11. 15-19, R. 107-109; See Photographs of Williams'property, R. 148155.)
From the time the last tenants vacated the Williams property in August 2002, until
July 3,2003, all utilities, including gas, power, water, and telephone had been shut off and/or
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were not in service. (See David Williams Deposition, p. 46,11. 5-8 and 21-23, R. I l l ; See
Public Utility Records, R. 117-132.)
In between August 2002 to July 3, 2003, there were several episodes of individuals
breaking and entering into the Williams property and responding officers noted that the
Williams property was vacant and abandoned. (See Police Records, R. 133-136.)
In addition, in between August 2002 to July 3,2003, Salt Lake City Corporation sent
several notices to Williams advising them that the property was vacant, unsecured,
improperly boarded and that the property was likely to become a haven for vagrants. (See
Letters From Salt Lake City Corp. R. 137-141.)
On July 3,2003, approximately 11 months since the Williams property had been lived
in, a fire occurred, causing significant damage to such. (See Affidavit of Rex Nelson, R. 142144; See Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147.)
Two fire investigators, Rex Nelson and Jeffrey Long, conducted separate
investigations to determine the cause and origin of the fire. Both investigators reached the
conclusion that: (1) the origin of the fire was at the bottom of the doorway leading into the
Williams property; (2) debris piled up at the bottom of the doorway where the fire originated
was used as fuel to ignite the fire; (3) no evidence of accidental causes were discovered that
would have caused or contributed to the fire; (4) and the fire resulted from an act of arson
with the willful intent to cause damage to the home by an individual using available
combustibles and a hand-held flame. (See Affidavit of Rex Nelson, R. 142-144; See
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Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147; See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 22,11. 6-25,j>. 23,11.
1 -16, p. 29,11. 18-23, p. 30,11. 3-6, p. 31,11. 1-9, p. 33,11. 5-9, p. 36,11. 11-14, p. 37,11. 17-24,
R. 156-164; See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 13,11. 9-14, p. 14,11. 7-17. p. 16,11. 10-14, p.
17,11. 2-6, p. 25,11. 3-12, p. 26,11. 5-9, p. 29,11. 1-6, p. 32,11. 14-18, p. 33,11. 7-12, p. 34,11.
4-25, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 165-178.)
Williams presented a claim with Bear River, demanding that it provide coverage for
the damages done as a result of the fire. (See R. 196.)
Bear River determined that the loss would not be covered by the policy of insurance,
Bear River filed a declaratory action, asking the trial court to find no coverage for the
damage to the Williams' property because: (1) the damage resulted from an act of vandalism
and malicious mischief while the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days
before the fire and the Williams' property was not being used principally used for dwelling
purposes at the time of the fire. (See Declaratory Complaint, R. 1-7.)
Williams have conceded that the home was vacant for more than 30 consecutive days
before the fire. (See Williams' Answer to Declaratory Complaint, ^f 19 R. 34 .)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Bear River. The
damage done to the Williams' property resulted from an act of vandalism and malicious
mischief when the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. Arson is a
form of vandalism and malicious mischief.
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The exclusion in the policy is clear and unambiguous. A reasonable purchaser of
insurance would understand that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the policy,
losses to the insured premises-when the premises have been vacant for more than thirty
consecutive days-which are a result of vandalism and malicious mischief (including arson)
are not covered by the policy.
Furthermore, there are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude granting
Bear River's Motion for Summary Judgment. Two expert fire investigators concluded that
the fire was an act of arson. Williams have failed to produce any evidence to suggest that
the fire was anything other than an act of vandalism and malicious mischief.
ARGUMENT
I.

General Principles and Construction,

Courts must accord terms contained in an insurance policy their plain and ordinary
meaning and apply those terms as written unless the terms are ambiguous or against public
policy. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002); Miller v. USSAA
Casualty Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663,676 (Utah 2002); First American Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch,
Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1998).
If an exclusion is clear and unambiguous and does not contravene public policy, it
must be applied as written. First American Title, 966 P.2d at 836; Village Inn Apartments
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Furthermore, an insurance contract's language must be construed according to its
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plain and ordinary meaning and a court cannot make a forced construction or fashion a new
contract for the parties. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Schilling, 520 N.W.2d 884, 887
(S.D. 1994). An unambiguous policy requires no construction and its plain terms must be
given full effect even though they are beneficial to an insurer and detrimental to the insured.
Littrell v. Colony Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
II.

The Trial Court Correctly Granted Bear River's Motion For Summary
Judgment And Correctly Held That No Coverage Was Afforded For The
Loss Since Williams' Property Had Been Vacant For More Than Thirty
(30) Days Prior To The Loss And The Loss Was An Act Of Vandalism
And Malicious Mischief

The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Bear River should
be upheld on appeal because the damage to the Williams property from the fire that occurred
on July 3, 2003 5 resulted from an act of vandalism and malicious mischief while the
Williams' property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days before the fire.
Bear River agreed to insure against certain types of losses to the Williams' property.
However, it did not agree to insure losses to the Williams' property caused by vandalism and
malicious mischief if the Williams' property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive
days prior to the loss. Specifically, the policy states:
PERILS INSURED AGAINST
COVERAGE A-DWELLING
STRUCTURES

and

COVERAGE

B-OTHER

We insure against risk of direct loss to property described in Coverages A and
B only if that loss is a physical loss to property; however, we do not insure
loss:
7

2.

caused by:
f.

vandalism and malicious mischief, theft or attempted theft if the
dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days
immediately before the loss . ..

(See Applicable Insurance Policy, Addendum B, p. 4, R. 12.)
Williams admit that, at the time the fire occurred on July 3, 2003, the Williams
property had been vacant for at least 30 consecutive days. (See Williams' Answer to
Declaratory Complaint, ^ 19, R. 34.) If the fire was an act of vandalism or malicious
mischief, the loss would not be covered. In seeking coverage under the policy,Williams
claim that "arson" (i.e., the intentional setting of a fire with intent to cause damage) is not an
act of vandalism or malicious mischief.
Although there are no Utah cases directly addressing the vandalism/malicious
mischief exclusion cited above in regards to arson, several courts throughout the nation have
interpreted the same or similar provision in situations involving similar facts and found that
arson is an act of vandalism and malicious mischief. For example, in Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Medley, 1998 U.S. District LEXIS 8085 (Dist. Ct. of Vir. 1998), a fire occurred
at the insured's rental property, which had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days.
Id. The property had been condemned by the city because it was uninhabitable, the utilities
were cut off, the home boarded up and debris was scattered all throughout the home. Id. The
insurance policy contained an exclusion from coverage for damage caused by vandalism or
malicious mischief if the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days before
8

the loss. Id. The insurer retained an independent fire investigator to examine the property
for the cause of the fire, and the city fire marshal also performed a similar investigation for
the city. Id. Both investigators found that the fire was an act of arson even though the
identity of the individual(s) causing the fire was unknown. Id. Accordingly, the court held
that the policy did not extend coverage to the loss and specifically found that arson is a form
of vandalism and malicious mischief. Id.
In Costabile v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 193 F.Supp.2d 465 (D. Conn.
2002), a fire occurred at the insured's rental property, which had been vacant for more than
a year and a half Id. at 467. An independent fire investigator and the city marshal both
concluded that the fire was the result of an act of arson. Id. at 468. In denying coverage for
the loss, the insurer relied on the exclusion in the policy for "vandalism or malicious
mischief when the premises are vacant or unoccupied for more than 30 consecutive days
immediately prior to the loss. Id. The term arson was not defined in the policy. Id. The type
of policy in that case was the same type of policy at issue in the instant case.1
In determining whether arson is a form of vandalism or malicious mischief, the court
stated that "because vandalism is not defined by the policy, under the Connecticut Rules of

Williams claim that malicious mischief/vandalism and fire are listed as separate in
Coverage C. However, Coverage C is for damage to personal property and is not an issue
in this case. Coverage A (Dwelling) and B (Other Structures) do not list
mischief/vandalism and fire as separate. The same policy provisions and language were
addressed in Costabile, where the court found that arson is a form of vandalism and found
there would be no coverage under Coverage A and B even though mischief/vandalism
and fire were listed separately in Coverage C.
9

Construction, it must be given its plain, ordinary meaning." Id. at 477. The court adopted
the definitions of vandalism and arson from Webster's Dictionary. Id. Based on the
commonality of the definitions, the court found that arson is included in the plain and
ordinary meaning of the term "vandalism," and stated that such conclusion "is further
supported by the weight of authority addressing vandalism exclusions under policies that
provide all risk coverage and do not list fire and vandalism as separate causes of loss." Id.
at 478.
Likewise, in Estes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 45 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D. Kan.
1999), the insured owned a home and used it for rental purposes until December 19, 1995.
Id. at 1228. From December 19, 1995, through July 28, 1996, the home was vacant while
the insured attempted to complete repairs demanded by the City. Id. at 1229. On or about
July 28, 1996, an unknown individual set fire to the home. Id. The insured made a claim
under the policy for damage done to the home. Relying on the policy exclusion which
excluded coverage for vandalism and malicious mischief if the home was vacant for 30 days
or more, the insurer denied coverage. Id.
Although the policy did not define the terms "vandalism" and "arson", the court
adopted the common definitions of those terms. Id. The court noted that the common
definition of vandalism is "the wilful or malicious destruction or defacement of things of
beauty or of public or private property", and that the common definition of arson is "the
wilful malicious burning of or attempts to burn any building, structure or property of another
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(as a house, a church, or a boat) . . . " Id., citing Webster's New International Dictionary
(1986) at 2532 and 122. The court found that arson of a private dwelling clearly is within
the plain and ordinary meaning of vandalism and applied the vandalism exclusion to deny
coverage and grant the insurer's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1229.
In American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Durrence, 872 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1989), the
insured's home, which was used as a rental property, was destroyed by a fire set by an
unknown arsonist. Id. At the time of the fire, the home had been vacant for several months,
which the insured admitted in his answer. Id. at 379. The insured's policy contained a
provision that excluded damage resulting from vandalism or malicious mischief if the
dwelling had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days prior to the loss. Id. Based on
that exclusion, the insurer filed a motion for summary judgment.
The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment based on the vandalism
exclusion, finding that "a common sense interpretation of the insurance contract 'Vandalism
or Malicious Mischief provision which contains the 'vacancy' exclusion, suggests that it
would apply to a fire set in a vacant house by an unknown arsonist or vandal." Id.
In Vennemann v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 334 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2003), the insured's
home was damaged by a fire. At the time of the fire, nobody resided in the home, but the
insured had been engaged in sporadic remodeling projects for over two months. Id. at 773.
The insurer denied coverage based on the exclusion in the policy which excluded coverage
for losses caused by vandalism and malicious mischief if the dwelling had been vacant for
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more than 30 consecutive days immediately before the loss. Id. The court held that the fire
was an act of vandalism and malicious mischief that occurred when the home was vacant for
at least 30 consecutive days prior to the fire.2 Id. at 774.
In Lundquist v. Allstate Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 627 (111. Ct. App. 2000), the insured's
home was also destroyed by fire set by arsonists. Id. at 628. At the time of the fire, nobody
had lived in the insured's home on a full lime basis for over a year. There had been an
incident of vandalism at the insured's home two months prior to the fire. Id. at 629. The
insurer denied the insured's claim for damages to the home based on the "vandalism or
malicious mischief exclusion, if the dwelling is vacant or unoccupied for more than 30
consecutive days immediately prior to the vandalism or malicious mischief." Id.
Again, the court found that the act of arson constituted vandalism or malicious
mischief under the policy and that the only question was whether the home had been vacant
for the required period of time. Id. at 630.
Finally, in Potomac Ins. Co. of III. v. NCUA a/k/a National Credit Union Assn., 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9844 (N.D. 111. 1996), the insurer also issued an insurance policy, which
contained an exclusion for damage occurring to the property as a result of vandalism if the
property had been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days before the loss. Id. The insured
premises became unoccupied and was subsequently boarded up. Id. Approximately four

2

Notably, the court stated that "a predictable pattern of habitation is significant in
the insurance context because when a building is not in use, it is more likely that potential
fire hazards will remain undiscovered or unremedied." Id.
12

months later, the property was set on fire by an unknown arsonist. Id. The insurer denied
coverage based on the vandalism/vacancy exclusion. Id.
Because the term "vandalism" was not defined in the policy, the court compared the
dictionary definitions of "arson" and "vandalism" and concluded that arson is a type of
vandalism. Specifically, the court stated:
Since "vandalism" is not defined in the policy, we must afford the term its
plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 607 N.E. 1204, 1215-16. Illinois courts often look to Webster's
International Dictionary for guidance when defining the "usual and ordinary"
meaning of contract language, See Id., and this source defines "vandalism" as
the "wilful or malicious destruction or defacement of things of beauty or of
public or private property." Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
2532 (1986); Accord, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1973 (3rd Edition 1992). Similarly, arson is defined by Webster's
as "the wilful and malicious burning of or attempt to burn any building,
structure, or property of another (as a house, a church, or a boat) or of one's
own [usually] with criminal or fraudulent intent." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 122 (1986); Accord, the American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 103 (3rd Edition 1992).
Considering the sources and the ordinary meaning of the terms, it is apparent
that arson - the wilful or malicious destruction of public or private property
through the setting of a fire - is a type of vandalism. Although NCUA argues
that the ordinary person would not equate serious acts of arson with petty
instances of vandalism, we find the conclusion NCUA draws from this
assertion - that arson does not constitute a species of vandalism - untenable.
Rather, given the definitions quoted above and the ordinary meanings of the
two terms, we must conclude that arson does indeed fall within the definition
of vandalism. We are mindful of our obligation to construe policy limitations
narrowly. Yet this principle of construction does not permit us to
unreasonably interpret a limitation provision out of an insurance contract, but
only to give insureds the benefit of an ambiguous term. The language of the
Policy in this case is not ambiguous: the wilful destruction of property is not
covered if the building has been vacant for 60 consecutive days. Under the
facts stipulated for purposes of this motion, Gonsch's building was vacant for
13

more than 60 days prior to the fire, and the fire was intentionally set by persons
unknown. Thus, under this set of facts, the vacancy provision in the Policy
plainly and unambiguously eliminates coverage. Because the policy's clear
and unambiguous terms must be applied as written, Hurst-Rosche Engineers,
Inc., v. Commercial Unions Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1336, 1342 (7th Cir. 1995), we
must conclude that Potomac has no coverage obligations for the damage by
arson at the insured premises. Id.
The majority of jurisdictions, as evidenced by the several cases cited above, have
found that arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief, and have denied coverage
on that basis where property has been vacant for 30 or more consecutive days.
The concept of the term "vandalism" (i.e., the "wilful or malicious destruction or
defacement of things of beauty or of public or private property"), does not limit "how" the
vandalism takes place. A "vandal" may use a baseball bat, a spray paint, a car, a crowbar,
a knife, or any number of other "instruments" to accomplish his wilful and malicious
destruction. He may use his bare hands. He may use a match. The point is, focus for
"vandalism" or "malicious mischief is not properly placed on the "means" by which the
wilful or malicious destruction is accomplished; rather, focus is placed on the "fact" of the
destruction itself.
In the instant case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the July 3,2003, fire at the
Williams' property was an act of vandalism and malicious mischief (i.e., an intentionally set
fire/arson). Two independent fire investigators, Rex Nelson of Salt Lake County, and Jeffrey
Long of Fire Analysis Investigations, LLC, both came to the conclusion that, in their expert
opinions, the July 3,2003, fire was an intentionally set fire; i.e., an act of arson. Specifically,
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both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Long found the following as it relates to the fire: (1) the origin of
the fire was at the bottom of a door at the Williams' property's south rear entrance; (2) there
was debris piled up at the base of the door that was used as fuel to ignite the fire; (3) no
accidental causes were discovered that would have caused or contributed to the origin of the
fire; (4) the fire resulted from an act of arson with the wilful intent to cause damage to the
home; and (5) the home had been abandoned/vacant for an extended period of time because
all of the windows were boarded up, there was no furniture present and there was a
significant amount of graffiti and garbage throughout the home. (See Affidavit of Rex
Nelson, R. 142-144; See Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147; See Rex Nelson Deposition,
p. 22,11. 6-25, p. 23,11. 1-16, p. 29,11. 18-23, p. 30,11. 3-6, p. 31,11. 1-9, p. 33,11. 5-9, p. 36,
11. 11-14, p. 37,11. 17-24, R. 156-164; See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 13,11. 9-14, p. 14,11.
7-17, p. 16,11. 10-14, p. 17,11. 2-6, p. 25,11. 3-12, p. 26,11. 5-9, p. 29,11. 1-6, p. 32,11. 14-18,
p. 33,11. 7-12, p. 34,11. 4-25, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 165-178.)
In addition to the conclusions of the fire investigators that the fire was the result of
arson, it is important to remind the Court of the fact that the Williams' property had
experienced several break ins and trespassing/drug incidents within the year prior to the fire.
(See Police Records, R. 133-136.) These incidents show that, in the year before the fire, the
Williams' property had become a haven for transients and/or other individuals engaging in
criminal behavior, including vandalism and malicious mischief.
Further, it is important to note (as discussed hereinafter) that Williams did not submit
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any evidence to oppose the conclusions reached by the fire investigators nor did Williams
submit any evidence to support any other possible cause of the fire.
One of the purposes of the vandalism/vacancy exclusion in homeowner's policies is
to encourage policy holders to maintain a continual presence in the home so as to guard
against a substantial increase of risk for vandalism. Belgrade v. National American Ins. Co.,
204 Cal.App.2d 44,47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). Williams clearly failed to maintain a continual
presence in the home. The property was vacant for at least 11 months and became a target
for continuous criminal activity, including the fire that destroyed the home.
Williams claim that because arson is not defined or mentioned in the policy, the term
is ambiguous and should not be considered vandalism or malicious mischief. (See Brief of
Appellant.) Utilizing such a position, an insurance policy would have to have an endless list
of possible instruments of destruction. The policy would have to be co-extensive with the
criminal imagination. The law does not impose such a duty on an insurer. Rather, the
language of the policy-excluding coverage when a house is vacant for more than 30
consecutive days and damage is done as a result of vandalism or malicious mischief
(whatever the instrumentality used)-is clear, plain and unambiguous.
As discussed above, Webster's Dictionary defines vandalism as "the wilful or
malicious destruction or defacement of things of beauty or of public or private
property "(note, without identifying the means by which such destruction or defacement takes
place) and arson as "the wilful malicious burning of or attempts to burn any building,
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structure or property of another (as a house, a church, or a boat) . . ." Id. Webster's New
International Dictionary (1986) at 2532 and 122.
Furthermore, the Utah criminal code states that a person is guilty of arson if the person
by means of fire or explosives unlawfully and intentionally damages the property of
another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102. (Emphasis added). Again, "arson" focuses on the
"means", whereas "vandalism" focuses on the damage by whatever means. "Arson" is a
more specific subset of vandalism. Both terms involve the wilful and malicious destruction
of property. Arson falls within the definition of "vandalism."
Williams have only cited two cases, Battishill v. Farmers Alliance Ins. Co. and
American States Ins. Co. v. Rancho San Marcos Properties, LLC, in support of their
position. However, those cases have taken a minority position on the issue of whether arson
is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief.
As to American States Ins. Co., that case did not even involve a building that was
intended to be used for dwelling purposes; rather, it involved an abandoned commercial
building. Also, the policy language in American States Ins. Co. is different.
As to Battishill, the court based its decision, in part, on the premise that insurance
coverage should be extended based on the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, and
that an insured would reasonably expect coverage for an arson fire. Battishill, 97 P.3d at
623-26. However, "the reasonable expectations doctrine" adopted in Battishill has been
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Specifically, in Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas.
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Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), the appellant's child was injured while on the insured
property. Id. at 799. The appellant subsequently tried to recover for the child's injuries on
a homeowner's policy, which the insurer rejected based on a household exclusion. Id. at 800.
The appellant sought to invalidate the household exclusion on the grounds that the insurance
policy was an adhesion contract and that the exclusion violated her reasonable expectations
of coverage. Id. However, the Utah Supreme Court rejected various versions of the
reasonable expectations doctrine advanced by the appellant and stated: "the fact that an
insurance contract is adhesive is no reason, in itself, to enforce what might be found to be the
reasonable expectations of the insured when those expectations conflict with the plain terms
of the policy." Id. at 803. "We reject the various versions of the reasonable expectations
doctrine advanced by Allen." Id. at 807.
In the instant case, the plain terms of the policy clearly exclude coverage for losses
caused by vandalism and malicious mischief when the Williams' property has been vacant
for 30 or more consecutive days.
It is difficult to imagine an insured would have a "reasonable expectation" that
property damaged by a baseball bat, a crowbar, spray paint, a vehicle intentionally driven into
a building, a knife, or a multitude of other destructive means would be properly excluded
from coverage but property damage caused by a lighted match intended to cause the same
damage would be covered.
In sum the vandalism/vacancy exclusion is clear and unambiguous in its inclusion of
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arson as a type of vandalism and malicious mischief Cases throughout the country that have
interpreted identical, or nearly identical, policy language have found such. Accordingly, the
trial court's decision granting Bear River's Motion for Summary Judgment should be upheld.
III.

Contrary To The Williams1 Assertions Otherwise, There Are No Issues Of
Material Fact That Would Preclude Granting Bear River's Motion For
Summary Judgment.

Williams argue that there is an issue as to whether the trial court correctly determined
that there were no issues of disputed fact precluding the grant of summary judgment in favor
of Bear River. Williams did not identify this issue in the Rule 9 Docketing Statement as
required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; rather, the only issue identified by the
Williams in their Docketing Statement is whether the trial court correctly determined that
arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief. (See Addendum C, Docketing
Statement.)
Because Williams did not identify the second issue, the Court should not consider
such on appeal. However, in the event the Court decides to consider the second issue, Bear
River presents the following:
Williams claim that even if this Court holds that arson is a form of vandalism and
malicious mischief, a factual issue exists because Bear River's experts cannot prove the fire
was set with the intent to damage the Williams' property because the identity of the person(s)
who set the fire is unknown. Williams' contentions are without support.
In the trial court, Williams failed to offer any evidence controverting the findings of
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Mr. Nelson and Mr. Long that the fire was intentionally set. Williams have presented no
affidavits, no sworn testimony, no expert opinion, and no facts to controvert the expert
opinions of the fire investigators. If such evidence did exist, which it does not, such evidence
should have presented at the trial level; not raised in the appellate court for the first time.
Further, both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Long found that: (1) the origin of the fire was at the
bottom of the doorway at the Williams'; (2) debris was piled up at the bottom of the doorway
where the fire originated and was used as fuel to ignite the fire: (3) no evidence of accidental
causes were discovered that would have caused or contributed to the fire; and (4) the fire
resulted from an act of arson with the willful intent to cause damage to the home by an
individual using combustibles and a hand-held flame. (See Affidavit of Rex Nelson, R. 142144; See Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147; See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 22,11. 6-25,
p. 23,11. 1-16, p. 29,11. 18-23, p. 30,11. 3-6, p. 31,11. 1-9, p. 33,11. 5-9, p. 36,11. 11-14, p. 37,
11. 17-24, R. 156-164; See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 13,11. 9-14, p. 14,11. 7-17, p. 16,11.
10-14, p. 17,11. 2-6, p. 25,11. 3-12, p. 26,11. 5-9, p. 29,11. 1-6, p. 32,11. 14-18, p. 33,11. 7-12,
p. 34,11. 4-25, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 165-178.)
Specifically, Mr. Nelson testified in his deposition as follows:
Q. It's my understanding from the testimony that I've heard today that-well,
first of all let me ask you an initial question. Would you tell us what your
definition would be of an act of arson?
A.

Act of arson is an intentionally set fire. When I said earlier in the
deposition it was a man caused fire that would probably be my opinion
that it's a man caused fire and it most likely is arson.
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(See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 29,11. 24-25, p. 30,11. 1-6, R. 159-160.)
Mr. Nelson further testified as follows:
Q.

As a fire investigator is it your experience that you can generally
determine the cause and origin of a fire without identifying the identity
of the person or source that set the fire?

A.

Sure.

Q.

And can you also determine that a fire was intentionally set without
knowing the identity of the individual that set the fire?

A.

Sure.

Q.

And in this case, based on the evidence that you observed and
collected, is it your opinion that this was most likely an intentionally
set fire or an act of arson?

A.

That would be my opinion.

(See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 32,11. 21-25, p. 33,11. 1-9, R. 162.)
Lastly, Mr. Nelson testified as follows:
Q.

So you have to sort of leave it open that it was an intentional fire?

A.

Well, we do that, but based on my experience in looking at these
fires, this fire started on the outside of the house. There was no
accidental way for it to have started. So I felt that the most likely
possibility was a hand held flame or somebody wanting to either
burn the house down or maybe they saw a pile of debris and just
wanted to light it on fire . . .

Q.

Although you testified you don't know for sure the intent of the
individual that you believe set the fire, you believe it's likely that
the fire resulted from an act of arson with the intent to cause
destruction?

A.

That's my opinion, yes. I believe it's an intentionally set fire.
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(See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 36,11. 9-19, p. 37,11. 18-24, R. 163-164.)
Mr. Long testified as follows as to his opinion as to the cause of the fire:
Q.

I have a few questions. As a fire investigator, Jeff, can you determine
the cause and origin in the fire without knowing the identity of the
person who caused the fire?

A.

Sure.

Q.

And can you make a determination that a fire was the result of arson
without knowing the identity of the person who set the fire?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you find any evidence that would indicate that this fire we are
talking about here today was accidentally caused?

A.

I found no evidence that it was accidentally caused. I removed all
accidental causes.

(See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 32,11. 5-16, R. 173.)
Mr. Long further testified as follows:
Q.

And then going back to my question, it's more likely than not that
this was the result of arson?

A.

Yes. If I would-if it had been my fire working as a criminal investigator
if I would have found the person who did it I would have screened
the case with the district attorney for a charge of arson.

Q.

But even not knowing the identity of the person you can still make
a determination more likely than not it was arson?

A.

Yes.

(See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, R. 176-177.)
Lastly, Mr. Long testified as follows:
22

Q.

I just have one more question. And just to be clear, can you look
at paragraph 12 of your affidavit, Jeff.

A.

Paragraph 12, yes.

Q.

It reads, it is my opinion that the fire resulted from an act of arson with
the wilful intent to cause damage to the home. Is that statement
correct?

A.

Yes.

(See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 178.)
Contrary to the Williams' assertions, Mr. Long did not repudiate paragraph 12 of his
Affidavit; rather, he affirmed it. He testified that although he does not know the exact intent
of the unknown arsonist, it is his opinion that the fire resulted from an act of arson. (See
Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 178.)
Again, this evidence was uncontroverted at the trial level. Moreover, this Court has
held that intent may be inferred from the nature of the act and the accompanying reasonable
foreseeability of harm. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). An effect which is the
natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident; whether
an intentional act leading to unintended harm is considered accidental or not generally
depends on the likelihood that the intentional act will result in harm of the type that in fact
occurred. Id.
In this case, the natural and probable consequence of the unknown arsonist's act of
igniting the fire at the base of the door where debris was piled up was that it would destroy
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or cause significant damage to the Williams' property. The inferred intent of the unknown
arsonist(s) is that he/she intended to cause damage to the Williams' property. If there was
another explanation, Williams could have presented such evidence at the trial level. They
did not.
CONCLUSION
Bear River requests that this Court affirm the trial court's summary judgment order,
which states that there is no coverage for the damages to the Williams' property located at
1163 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, because the damage resulted from an act of
vandalism and malicious mischief
(arson) while the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days.
DATED this / £

day of January, 2006.
SMITH & GLAUSER

LOWELL V. SMITH
JUSTIN E. SCOTT
Attorneys for Appellee Bear River
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE BEAR
RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY was mailed, postage prepaid, this Uj^ day
of January, 2006 to:
Shawn D. Turner
Larson Turner Fairbanks & Dalby, L.C.
1218 W. South Jordan Pkwy, #B
South Jordan, UT 84095
<=^LK^—-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
V.

l
;)
)
;)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF, BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

j

DAVID WILLIAMS and DEANNA
WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

i
]
]I
I
]

AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 030923716
Judge L.A. Dever

Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and Defendants, David Williams
and Deanna Williams, filed Motions for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. These motions came before the Honorable L. A. Dever for oral
argument on May 31, 2005. Plaintiff was represented by Justin Scott, Smith & Glauser,
P.C. Defendants were represented by Shawn Turner, Larson, Turner, Fairbanks & Dalby,
P.C.

The Court, having reviewed the motions for summary judgment and supporting
memoranda, having considered oral argument presented in support of and in opposition
to the motions for summary judgment, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby,
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that:
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The policy issued
by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company specifically excludes coverage for damages
caused by vandalism and malicious mischief when the property has been vacant for more
than 30 consecutive days. Arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief, consistent
with the exclusion contained in the policy. There is no coverage for the damages to the
defendant insureds' property located at 1163 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
which resulted from an act of vandalism and malicious mischief on July 3, 2003 when the
property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days.
3.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
DATED this

H

day of June, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

THE»HOrWiRApc§JUA. DEVER
Third D\st(\&Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this 5 ; ^ day of May, 2005 to:
Shawn D. Turner
Larson Turner Fairbanks & Dalby, L.C.
1218 W. South Jordan Pkwy, #B
South Jordan, UT 84095
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DWELLING FIRE INSURANCE DECLARATION PAGE
This Declaration Page and the non-assessable dwelling policy provisions are the contractual obligations assumed by the Insured
and Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, Murray, Utah.
NAMED INSURED

Print Date 01/06/2003

WILLIAiMS, DAVID AND DEANNA
PO BOX 25670

Policy Number Fl78238

HONOLULU, HI 96825

Agent Info
Agent No. 85
Sub-Agent
MONSON INSURANCE
635 W 5300 SSTE 201

MAILING ADDRESS
WILLIAMS, DAVID AND DEANNA
PO BOX 25670

MURRAY UT 84123
801-269-1999

HONOLULU, HI 96825

Renewal Declaration
Policy Term: 12:01 a.m. MST at Location of Property Described
Yr. of Const. 1945
Type of Const. Frame
Prot. Class
3
Number of Units

From: 03/05/2003 To: 03/05/2004

Insured Property Location
1163 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115

On each dwelling the insurance is afforded only with respect to the dwelling as indicated and by a specific premium charge or charges.
The limits of the Company's liability against each such coverage or peril insured against shall be stated herein for which a premium is
charged subject to the provisions of the policy and endorsements added thereto. Insurance is provided only with respect to the following
coverages for which a limit of liability is specified, subject to all conditions of this policy.
Coverages
Dwelling

Limits of Liability

Form and Endorsement made part of this Policy at time
of issue. ISO Form Number(s)

94.00

50,000

Contents
Liability (DLC)

Premium

SPECIAL PROVISIONS - UTAH

0.00
300,000 / 1,000 MED

Total Premium

55.00

149.00

DEDUCTIBLE — All Coverage and Endorsements are subject to a 250

Mortgagee (s) as their interest may appear.

DP3,DLC,

J
deductible.

Premium Payable By Mortgagee [No

Dwelling Property 3
Special Form
Ed. 7-88

AGREEMENT
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the premium and compliance with all applicable
provisions of this policy.

DEFINITIONS
In this policy, "you" and "your" refer to the "named insured" shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident
of the same household. "We," "us" and "our" refer to the Company providing this insurance.

COVERAGES
This insurance applies to the Described Location,
Coverages for which a Limit of Liability is shown and
Perils Insured Against for which a Premium is stated.
COVERAGE A - Dwelling
We cover:
1. the dwelling on the Described Location shown in
the Declarations, used principally for dwelling purposes, including structures attached to the dwelling;
2. materials and supplies located on or next to the
Described Location used to construct, alter or repair the dwelling or other structures on the Described Location; and
3. if not otherwise covered in this policy, building
equipment and outdoor equipment used for the
service of and located on the Described Location.
This coverage does not apply to land, including land
on which the dwelling is located.
COVERAGE B - Other Structures
We cover other structures on the Described Location,
set apart from the dwelling by clear space. This includes structures connected to the dwelling by only a
fence, utility line, or similar connection.

COVERAGE C - Personal Property
We cover personal property, usual to the occupancy
as a dwelling and owned or used by you or members
of your family residing with you while it is on the Described Location. At your request, we will cover personal property owned by a guest or servant while the
property is on the Described Location.
Property Not Covered. We do not cover:
1. accounts, bank notes, bills, bullion, coins, currency, deeds, evidences of debt, gold other than
goldware, letters of credit, manuscripts, medals,
money, notes other than bank notes, passports,
personal records, platinum, securities, silver other
than silverware, tickets and stamps;
2. animals, birds or fish;
3. aircraft and parts. Aircraft means any contrivance
used or designed for flight, except model or hobby
aircraft not used or designed to carry people or
cargo;
4. motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances. This includes:
a. their equipment and accessories; or

We do not cover other structures:

b. any device or instrument for the transmitting,
recording, receiving or reproduction of sound or
pictures which is operated by power from the
electrical system of motor vehicles or all other
motorized land conveyances, including:

1. used in whole or in part for commercial, manufacturing or farming purposes; or
2. rented or held for rental to any person not a tenant
of the dwelling, unless used solely as a private garage.

(1) accessories or antennas; or
(2) tapes, wires, records, discs or other media
for use with any such device or instrument;
while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance.

This coverage does not apply to land, including land
on which the other structures are located.
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We do cover vehicles or conveyances not subject
to motor vehicle registration which are:
a. used to service the Described Location; or
b. designed for assisting the handicapped;
5. watercraft, other than rowboats and canoes;
6. data, including data stored in:
a. books of account, drawings or other paper
records; or
b. electronic data processing tapes, wires, records, discs or other software media.
However, we do cover the cost of blank recording
or storage media, and of pre-recorded computer
programs available on the retail market;
7. credit cards or fund transfer cards.
If you remove personal property from the Described
Location to a newly acquired principal residence, the
Coverage C limit of liability will apply at each residence for the 30 days immediately after you begin to
move the property there. This time period will not
extend beyond the termination of this policy. Our liability is limited to the proportion of the limit of liability that
the value at each residence bears to the total value of
all personal property covered by this policy.
COVERAGE D - Fair Rental Value
If a loss to property described in Coverage A, B or C
by a Peril Insured Against under this policy makes that
part of the Described Location rented to others or held
for rental by you unfit for its normal use, we cover its:
Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair rental value of
that part of the Described Location rented to others
or held for rental by you less any expenses that do
not continue while that part of the Described Location rented or held for rental is not fit to live in.
Payment will be for the shortest time required to repair
or replace that part of the Described Location rented
or held for rental.
If a civil authority prohibits you from use of the Described Location as a result of direct damage to a
neighboring location by a Peril Insured Against in this
policy, we cover the Fair Rental Value loss for no
more than two weeks.
The periods of time referenced above are not limited
by the expiration of this policy.
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation
of a lease or agreement.
COVERAGE E - Additional Living Expense
If a loss to property described in Coverage A, B or C
by a Peril Insured Against under this policy makes the
Described Location unfit for its normal use, we cover
your:
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Additional Living Expense, meaning any necessary increase in living expenses incurred by you so
that your household can maintain its normal standard of living.
Payment will be for the shortest time required to repair
or replace the Described Location or, if you permanently relocate, the shortest time required for your
household to settle elsewhere.
If a civil authority prohibits you from use of the Described Location as a result of direct damage to a
neighboring location by a Peril Insured Against in this
policy, we cover the Additional Living Expense loss for
no more than two weeks.
The periods of time referenced above are not limited
by the expiration of this policy.
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation
of a lease or agreement.
OTHER COVERAGES
1. Other Structures. You may use up to 10% of the
Coverage A limit of liability for loss by a Peril Insured Against to other structures described in
Coverage B.
Use of this coverage does not reduce the Coverage A limit of liability for the same loss.
2. Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable
expense for the removal of:
a. debris of covered property if a Peril Insured
Against causes the loss; or
b. ash, dust or particles from a volcanic eruption
that has caused direct loss to a building or
property contained in a building.
Debris removal expense is included in the limit of
liability applying to the damaged property.
3. Improvements, Alterations and Additions. If you
are a tenant of the Described Location, you may
use up to 10% of the Coverage C limit of liability
for loss by a Peril Insured Against to improvements, alterations and additions, made or acquired
at your expense, to that part of the Described Location used only by you.
Use of this coverage does not reduce the Coverage C limit of liability for the same loss.
4. World-Wide Coverage. You may use up to 10%
of the Coverage C limit of liability for loss by a Peril
Insured Against to property covered under Coverage C except rowboats and canoes, while anywhere in the world.
Use of this coverage reduces the Coverage C limit
of liability for the same loss.

Office, Inc., 1988, 1992
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5. Rental Value and Additional Living Expense.
You may use up to 10% of the Coverage A limit of
liability for loss of both fair rental value as described in Coverage D and additional living expense as described in Coverage E.
Use of this coverage does not reduce the Coverage A limit of liability for the same loss.
6. Reasonable Repairs. In the event that covered
property is damaged by an applicable Peril Insured
Against, we will pay the reasonable cost incurred
by you for necessary measures taken solely to protect against further damage. If the measures taken
involve repair to other damaged property, we will
pay for those measures only if that property is covered under this policy and the damage to that
property is caused by an applicable Peril Insured
Against.
This coverage:
a. does not increase the limit of liability that applies to the covered property;
b. does not relieve you of your duties, in case of a
loss to covered property, as set forth in Condition 4.b.
7. Property Removed. We insure covered property
against direct loss from any cause while being removed from a premises endangered by a Peril Insured Against and for no more than 30 days while
removed.
This coverage does not change the limit of liability
that applies to the property being removed.
8. Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover trees,
shrubs, plants or lawns, on the Described Location
for loss caused by the following Perils Insured
Against: Fire or lightning, Explosion, Riot or civil
commotion, Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or operated by you or a resident of the Described Location
or Vandalism or malicious mischief, including
damage during a burglary or attempted burglar;/,
but not theft of property.
The limit of liability for this coverage will not be
more than 5% of the Coverage A limit of liability, or
more than $500 for any one tree, shrub or plant.
We do not cover property grown for commercial
purposes.
This coverage is additional insurance.
9. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay up
to $500 for your liability assumed by contract or
agreement for fire department charges incurred
when the fire department is called to save or protect covered property from a Peril Insured Against.
We do not cover fire department service charges if
the property is located within the limits of the city,
municipality or protection district furnishing the fire
department response.

10. Collapse. We insure for risk of direct physical loss
to covered property involving collapse of a building
or any part of a building caused only by one or
more of the following:
a. Perils Insured Against in Coverage C - Personal Property. These perils apply to covered
building and personal property for loss insured
by this Other Coverage;
b. hidden decay;
c. hidden insect or vermin damage;
d. weight of contents, equipment, animals or
people;
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof;
f. use of defective material or methods in construction, remodeling or renovation if the collapse occurs during the course of the construction, remodeling or renovation.
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, swimming pool, underground pipe, flue, drain, cesspool,
septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead,
pier, wharf or dock is not included under items b, c,
d, e and f unless the loss is a direct result of the
collapse of a building.
Collapse does not include settling, cracking,
shrinking, bulging or expansion.
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability
applying to the damaged covered property.
11. Glass or Safety Glazing Material. We cover:
a. the breakage of glass or safety glazing material
which is part of a covered building, storm door
or storm window; and
b. damage to covered property by glass or safety
glazing material which is part of a building,
storm door or storm window.
This coverage does not include loss on the Described Location if the dwelling has been vacant
for more than 30 consecutive days immediately
before the loss. A dwelling being constructed is
not considered vacant.
Loss for damage to glass will be settled on the basis of replacement with safety glazing materials
when required by ordinance or law.
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability
that applies to the damaged property.

This coverage is additional insurance. No deductible applies to this coverage.

w
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PERILS INSURED AGAINST
COVERAGE A - DWELLING and
COVERAGE B - OTHER STRUCTURES
We insure against risk of direct loss to property described in Coverages A and B only if that loss is a
physical loss to property; however, we do not insure
loss:
1. involving collapse, other than as provided in Other
Coverages 10;
2. caused by:
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning
or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or
of a household appliance, or by discharge,
leakage or overflow from within the system or
appliance caused by freezing. This exclusion
applies only while the dwelling is vacant, unoccupied or being constructed unless you have
used reasonable care to:
(1) maintain heat in the building; or
(2) shut off the water supply and drain the
system and appliances of water;
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of water
or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to a:
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming pool;
(2) foundation, retaining wall or bulkhead; or
(3) pier, wharf or dock;
c. theft of property not part of a covered building
or structure;
d. theft in or to a dwelling or structure under construction;
e. wind, hail, ice, snow or sleet to:
(1) outdoor radio and television antennas and
aerials including their lead-in wiring, masts
or towers; or
(2) trees, shrubs, plants or lawns;
f. vandalism and malicious mischief, theft or
attempted theft if the dwelling has been vacant
for more than 30 consecutive days immediately
before the loss. A dwelling being constructed is
not considered vacant;
g. constant or repeated seepage or leakage of
water or steam over a period of weeks, months
or years from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or from within a household appliance;
h. (1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration;

(4) smoke from agricultural smudging or industrial operations;
(5) discharge, dispersal, seepage,
release or escape of pollutants.

Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed;
(6) settling, shrinking, bulging or expansion,
including resultant cracking, of pavements,
patios, foundations, walls, floors, roofs or
ceilings; or
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or domestic
animals.
If any of these cause water damage not otherwise excluded, from a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or household appliance, we cover
loss caused by the water including the cost of
tearing out and replacing any part of a building
necessary to repair the system or appliance.
We do not cover loss to the system or appliance from which this water escaped.
3. excluded under General Exclusions.
Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to property
described in Coverages A and B not excluded or
excepted in this policy is covered.
COVERAGE C - PERSONAL PROPERTY
We insure for direct physical loss to the property described in Coverage C caused by a peril listed below
unless the loss is excluded in the General Exclusions.
1. Fire or lightning.
2. Windstorm or hail.
This peril does not include loss to:
a. property contained in a building caused by rain,
snow, sleet, sand or dust unless the direct
force of wind or hail damages the building
causing an opening in a roof or wall and the
rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through
this opening;
b. canoes and rowboats; or
c. trees, shrubs or plants.
3. Explosion.
4. Riot or civil commotion.

(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechanical
breakdown;

5. Aircraft, including self-propelled
spacecraft.

(3) smog, rust or other corrosion, mold, wet or
dry rot;

6. Vehicles.
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7. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental damage
from smoke.
This peril does not include loss caused by smoke
from agricultural smudging or industrial operations.
8. Vandalism or malicious mischief.
This peril does not include loss by pilferage, theft,
burglary or larceny.
9. Damage by Burglars, meaning damage to covered property caused by Burglars.
This peril does not include:
a. theft of property; or
b. damage caused by burglars to property on the
Described Location if the dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days immediately before the damage occurs. A dwelling
being constructed is not considered vacant.
10. Falling Objects.
This peril does not include loss to property contained in the building unless the roof or an outside
wall of the building is first damaged by a falling object
Damage to the falling object itself is not covered.
11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes damage to property contained in the building.
12.Accidental discharge or overflow of water or
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system
or from within a household appliance.

This peril does not include loss:
a. to the system or appliance from which the
water or steam escaped;
b. caused by or resulting from freezing except as
provided in the peril of freezing below; or
c. on the Described Location caused by accidental discharge or overflow which occurs off the
Described Location.
In this peril, a plumbing system does not include a
sump, sump pump or related equipment.
13. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, cracking,
burning or bulging of a steam or hot water heating system, an air conditioning or automatic fire
protective sprinkler system, or an appliance for
heating water.
This peril does not include loss caused by or resulting from freezing except as provided in the peril
of freezing below.
14.Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning
or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or of a
household appliance.
This peril does not include loss on the Described
Location while the dwelling is unoccupied or being
constructed, unless you have used reasonable
care to:
a. maintain heat in the building; or
b. shut off the water supply and drain the system
and appliances of water.
15. Sudden and accidental damage from artificially
generated electrical current.
This peril does not include loss to a tube, transistor
or similar electronic component.
16.Volcanic Eruption other than loss caused by
earthquake, land shock waves or tremors.

GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the
loss.
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of
any ordinance or law regulating the use, construction, repair, or demolition of a building or
other structure, unless specifically provided under this policy.
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake including land shock waves or tremors before, during
or after a volcanic eruption; landslide; mine
subsidence; mudflow; earth sinking, rising or
shifting; unless direct loss by:
(1) fire;
(2) explosion; or
DP 00 03 07 88

(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing material
which is part of a building, storm door or
storm window;
ensues and then we will pay only for the ensuing loss.
c. Water Damage, meaning:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water,
overflow of a body of water, or spray from
any of these, whether or not driven by wind;
(2) water which backs up through sewers or
drains or which overflows from a sump; or
(3) water below the surface of the ground,
including water which exerts pressure on or
seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk,
driveway, foundation, swimming pool or
other structure.

Onnvrinht Insurance Services Office Inc

1988 1992

ft

Paae 5 of 9

Direct loss by fire or explosion resulting from
water damage is covered.
d. Power Failure, meaning the failure of power or
other utility service if the failure takes place off
the Described Location. But, if a Peril insured
Against ensues on the Described Location, we
will pay only for that ensuing loss.
e. Neglect, meaning your neglect to use all reasonable means to save and preserve property
at and after the time of a loss.
f. War, including undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a
military force or military personnel, destruction
or seizure or use for a military purpose, and including any consequence of any of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a
warlike act even if accidental.

2. We do not insure for loss to property described in
Coverages A and B caused by any of the following.
However, any ensuing loss to property described in
Coverages A and B not excluded or excepted in
this policy is covered.
a. Weather conditions. However, this exclusion
only applies if weather conditions contribute in
any way with a cause or event excluded in
paragraph 1. above to produce the loss;
b. Acts or decisions, including the failure to act
or decide, of any person, group, organization or
governmental body;
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective;
(1) planning, zoning, development, surveying,
siting;
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, repair,
construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction;

g. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in the
Nuclear Hazard Clause of the Conditions.

(3) materials used in repair, construction, renovation or remodeling; or
(4) maintenance;

h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out
of any act committed:
(1) by or at the direction of you or any person or
organization named as an additional insured; and

of part or all of any property whether on or off
the Described Location.

(2) with the intent to cause a loss.

CONDITIONS
1. Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss
which occurs during the policy period.

(3) keep an accurate record of repair expenses;

2. Insurable interest and Limit of Liability. Even if
more than one person has an insurable interest in
the property covered, we will not be liable in any
one loss:

c. prepare an inventory of damaged personal
property showing the quantity, description, actual cash value and amount of loss. Attach all
bills, receipts and related documents that justify
the figures in the inventory;

a. for an amount greater than the interest of a
person insured under this policy; or
b. for more than the applicable limit of liability.
3. Concealment or Fraud. The entire policy will be
void if, whether before or after a loss, you have:
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented any
material fact or circumstance;
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or
c. made false statements;
relating to this insurance.
4. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to covered property, you must see that the following are
done:

d. as often as we reasonably require:
(1) show the damaged property;
(2) provide us with records and documents we
request and permit us to make copies; and
(3) submit to examination under oath, while not
in the presence of any other named insured,
and sign the same;
e. send to us, within 60 days after our request,
your signed, sworn proof of loss which sets
forth, to the best of your knowledge and belief:
(1) the time and cause of loss;

a. give prompt notice to us or our agent;

(2) your interest and that of all others in the
property involved and all liens on the property;

b. (1) protect the property from further damage;

(3) other insurance which may cover the loss;

(2) make reasonable and necessary repairs to
protect the property; and

(4) changes in title or occupancy of the property
during the term of the policy;

\H
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(5) specifications of damaged buildings and
detailed repair estimates;
(6) the inventory of damaged personal property
described in 4c;

(3) To determine the amount of insurance
required to equal 80% of the full replacement cost of the building immediately before
the loss, do not include the value of:

(7) receipts for additional living expenses incurred and records that support the fair
rental value loss.

(a) excavations, foundations, piers or any
supports which are below the undersurface of the lowest basement floor;

5. Loss Settlement. Covered property losses are
settled as follows:

(b) those supports in (a) above which are
below the surface of the ground ins;ide
the foundation walls, if there is no
basement; and

a. (1) Personal property;
(2) Awnings, carpeting, household appliances,
outdoor antennas and outdoor equipment,
whether or not attached to buildings; and
(3) Structures that are not buildings;
at actual cash value at the time of loss but not
more than the amount required to repair or replace.
b. Buildings under Coverage A or B at replacement cost without deduction for depreciation,
subject to the following:
(1) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insurance in this policy on the damaged building
is 80% or more of the full replacement cost
of the building immediately before the loss,
we will pay the cost to repair or replace, after application of deductible and without deduction for depreciation, but not more than
the least of the following amounts:
*

(a) the limit of liability under this policy that
applies to the building;

(b) the replacement cost of that part of the
building damaged for like construction
and use on the same premises; or
(c) the necessary amount actually spent to
repair or replace the damaged building.
(2) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insurance in this policy on the damaged building
is less than 80% of the full replacement cost
of the building immediately before the loss,
we will pay the greater of the following
amounts, but not more than the limit of liability under this policy that applies to the
building:
(a) the actual cash value of that part of the
building damaged; or
(b) that proportion of the cost to repair or
replace, after application of deductible
and without deduction for depreciation,
that part of the building damaged, which
the total amount of insurance in this policy on the damaged building bears to
80% of the replacement cost of the
building.
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(c) underground flues, pipes, wiring and
drains.
(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash
value of the damage unless:
(a) actual repair or replacement is complete; or
(b) the cost to repair or replace the damage
is both:
(i) less than 5% of the amount of insurance in this policy on the building;
and
(ii) less than $2500.
(5) You may disregard the replacement cost
loss settlement provisions and make claim
under this policy for loss or damage to
buildings on an actual cash value basis.
You may then make claim within 180 days
after loss for any additional liability on a replacement cost basis.
6. Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of loss to a pair or
set we may elect to:
a. repair or replace any part to restore the pair or
set to its value before the loss; or
b. pay the difference between actual cash value of
the property before and after the loss.
7. Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be settled on
the basis of replacement with safety glazing materials when required by ordinance or law.
8. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the
amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal of
the loss. In this event, each party will choose a
competent appraiser within 20 days after receiving
a written request from the other. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree
upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may request that the choice be made by a judge of a
court of record in the state where the Described
Location is located. The appraisers will separately
set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a
written report of an agreement to us, the amount
agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail
to agree, they will submit their differences to the
umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will set
the amount of loss.
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Each party will:
a. pay its own appraiser; and
b. bear the other expenses of the appraisal and
umpire equally.
9. Other Insurance. If property covered by this policy
is also covered by other fire insurance, we will pay
only the proportion of a loss caused by any peril
insured against under this policy that the limit of liability applying under this policy bears to the total
amount of fire insurance covering the property.
10.Subrogation. You may waive in writing before a
loss all rights of recovery against any person. If not
waived, we may require an assignment of rights of
recovery for a loss to the extent that payment is
made by us.
If an assignment is sought, the person insured
must sign and deliver all related papers and cooperate with us.
11.Suit Against Us. No action can be brought unless
the policy provisions have been complied with and
the action is started within one year after the date
of loss.
12.0ur Option. If we give you written notice within 30
days after we receive your signed, sworn proof of
loss, we may repair or replace any part of the
damaged property with like property.
13. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with you.
We will pay you unless some other person is
named in the policy or is legally entitled to receive
payment. Loss will be payable 60 days after we receive your proof of loss and:
a. reach an agreement with you;
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award with us.
14. Abandonment of Property. We need not accept
any property abandoned by you.
15. Mortgage Clause.
The word "mortgagee" includes trustee.
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss
payable under Coverage A or B will be paid to the
mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more
than one mortgagee is named, the order of payment will be the same as the order of precedence
of the mortgages.
If we deny your claim, that denial will not apply to a
valid claim of the mortgagee, if the mortgagee:
a. notifies us of any change in ownership, occupancy or substantial change in risk of which the
mortgagee is aware;
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b. pays any premium due under this policy on
demand if you have neglected to pay the premium; and
c. submits a signed, sworn statement of loss
within 60 days after receiving notice from us of
your failure to do so. Policy conditions relating
to Appraisal, Suit Against Us and Loss Payment apply to the mortgagee.
If we decide to cancel or not to renew this policy,
the mortgagee will be notified at least 10 days before the date cancellation or nonrenewal takes effect.
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny
payment to you:
a. we are subrogated to all the rights of the mortgagee granted under the mortgage on the
property; or
b. at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee the
whole principal on the mortgage plus any accrued interest. In this event, we will receive a
full assignment and transfer of the mortgage
and all securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt.
Subrogation will not impair the right of the mortgagee to recover the full amount of the mortgagee's claim.
16. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any
assignment or grant any coverage that benefits a
person or organization holding, storing or moving
property for a fee regardless of any other provision
of this policy.
17. Cancellation.
a. You may cancel this policy at any time by returning it to us or by letting us know in writing of
the date cancellation is to take effect.
b. We may cancel this policy only for the reasons
stated below by letting you know in writing of
the date cancellation takes effect. This cancellation notice may be delivered to you, or mailed
to you at your mailing address shown in the
Declarations.
Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.
(1) When you have not paid the premium, we
may cancel at any time by letting you know
at least 10 days before the date cancellation
takes effect
(2) When this policy has been in effect for less
than 60 days and is not a renewal with us,
we may cancel for any reason by letting you
know at least 10 days before the date cancellation takes effect.
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(3) When this policy has been in effect for 60
days or more, or at any time if it is a renewal
with us, we may cancel:
(a) if there has been a material misrepresentation of fact which if known to us
would have caused us not to issue the
policy; or
(b) if the risk has changed substantially
since the policy was issued.
This can be done by letting you know at
least 30 days before the date cancellation
takes effect.
(4) When this policy is written for a period of
more than one year, we may cancel for any
reason at anniversary by letting you know at
least 30 days before the date cancellation
takes effect.
c. When this policy is cancelled, the premium for
the period from the date of cancellation to the
expiration date will be refunded pro rata.
d. If the return premium is not refunded with the
notice of cancellation or when this policy is returned to us, we will refund it within a reasonable time after the date cancellation takes effect.
18. Non-Renewal. We may elect not to renew this
policy. We may do so by delivering to you, or mailing to you at your mailing address shown in the
Declarations, written notice at least 30 days before
the expiration date of this policy. Proof of mailing
will be sufficient proof of notice.
19. Liberalization Clause. If we make a change
which broadens coverage under this edition of our
policy without additional premium charge, that
change will automatically apply to your insurance
as of the date we implement the change in your
state, provided that this implementation date falls
within 60 days prior to or during the policy period
stated in the Declarations.

21. Assignment. Assignment of this policy will not be
valid unless we give our written consent.
22. Death. If you die, we insure:
a. your legal representatives but only with respect
to the property of the deceased covered under
the policy at the time of death;
b. with respect to your property, the person having
proper temporary custody of the property until
appointment and qualification of a legal representative.
23. Nuclear Hazard Clause.
a. "Nuclear Hazard" means any nuclear reaction,
radiation or radioactive contamination, all
whether controlled or uncontrolled or however
caused, or any consequence of any of these.
b. Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will not be
considered loss caused by fire, explosion, or
smoke, whether these perils are specifically
named in or otherwise included within the Perils
Insured Against.
c. This policy does not apply to loss caused directly or indirectly by nuclear hazard, except
that direct loss by fire resulting from the nuclear
hazard is covered.
24.Recovered Property. If you or we recover any
property for which we have made payment under
this policy, you or we will notify the other of the recovery. At your option, the property will be returned
to or retained by you or it will become our property.
If the recovered property is returned to or retained
by you, the loss payment will be adjusted based on
the amount you received for the recovered property.
25. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more volcanic
eruptions that occur within a 72-hour period will be
considered as one volcanic eruption.

This Liberalization Clause does not apply to
changes implemented through introduction of a
subsequent edition of our policy.
20.Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A
waiver or change of a provision of this policy must
be in writing by us to be valid. Our request for an
appraisal or examination will not waive any of our
rights.
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DWELLING PROPERTY
DP 01 43 04 98

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS - UTAH
OTHER COVERAGES
10. In Forms DP 00 02 and DP 00 03, Collapse is
deleted and replaced by the following:
10. Collapse
a. With respect to this Other Coverage:
(1) Collapse means an abrupt falling down or
caving in of a building or any part of a building with the result that the building or part of
the building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose.
(2) A building or any part of a building that is in
danger of falling down or caving in is not
considered to be in a state of collapse.
(3) A part of a building that is standing is not
considered to be in a state of collapse even
if it has separated from another part of the
building.
(4) A building that is standing or any part of a
building that is standing is not considered to
be in a state of collapse even if it shows
evidence of cracking, bulging, sagging,
bending, leaning, settling, shrinkage or expansion.
b. We insure for direct physical loss to covered
property involving collapse of a building or any
part of a building if the collapse was caused by
one or more of the following:
(1) Perils Insured Against in Coverage C Personal Property. These perils apply to
covered building and personal property for
loss insured by this Other Coverage;
(2) Decay that is hidden from view, unless the
presence of such decay is known to you
prior to collapse;
(3) Insect or vermin damage that is hidden from
view, unless the presence of such damage
is known to you prior to collapse;
(4) Weight of contents, equipment, animals or
people;
(5) Weight of rain which collects on a roof; or
(6) Use of defective material or methods in
construction, remodeling or renovation if the
collapse occurs during the course of the
construction, remodeling or renovation.

Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement,
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue,
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock is
not included under Items (2), (3), (4), (5),
and (6) unless the loss is a direct result of
the collapse of a building or any part of a
building.
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability
applying to the damaged covered property.
11. In Forms DP 00 02 and DP 00 03, Glass or
Safety Glazing Material is deleted and replaced
by the following:
11. Glass Or Safety Glazing Material
a. We cover:
(1) The breakage of glass or safety glazing
material which is part of a covered building,
storm door or storm window;
(2) The breakage, caused directly by Earth
Movement, of glass or safety glazing material which is part of a covered building,
storm door or storm window; and
(3) The direct physical loss to covered property
caused solely by the pieces, fragments or
splinters of broken glass or safety glazing
material which is part of a building, storm
door or storm window.
b. This coverage does not include loss:
(1) To covered property which results because
the glass or safety glazing material has
been broken, except as provided in a.(3)
above; or
(2) On the Described Location if the dwelling
has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days immediately before the loss, except when the breakage results directly
from Earth Movement as provided for in
a.(2) above. A dwelling being constructed is
not considered vacant.
Loss to glass covered under this Other Coverage
11. will be settled on the basis of replacement with
safety glazing materials when required by Ordinance or Law.
This coverage does not increase the Limit of Liability that applies to the damaged property.
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The following Other Coverage is added to all forms
except DP 00 01. When you are a tenant of a Described Location covered under this policy, the words
'covered building' used below, refer to property at
such a Described Location covered under Other Coverage 3. Improvements, Alterations And Additions.
12. Ordinance Or Law
a. The Ordinance Or Law Limit of Liability determined in b. or c. below will apply with respect to
the increased costs you incur due to the enforcement of any ordinance or law which requires or regulates:
(1) The construction, demolition, remodeling,
renovation or repair of that part of a covered
building or other structure damaged by a
Peril Insured Against;
(2) The demolition and reconstruction of the
undamaged part of a covered building or
other structure, when that building or other
structure must be totally demolished because of damage by a Peril Insured Against
to another part of that covered building or
other structure; or
(3) The remodeling, removal or replacement of
the portion of the undamaged part of a covered building or other structure necessary to
complete the remodeling, repair or replacement of that part of the covered building or other structure damaged by a Peril
Insured Against
b. If you are an owner of a Described Location,
and that location:
(1) Is insured for Coverage A or Unit-Owners
Building Items, you may use up to 10% of
the Limit of Liability that applies to Coverage
A or Unit-Owners Building Items at each
Described Location; or
(2) Is not insured for Coverage A or UnitOwners Building Items, you may use up to
10% of the total Limit of Liability that applies
to Coverage B at each Described Location.
c. If you are a tenant of a Described Location, you
may use up to 10% of the Limit of Liability that
applies to Improvements, Alterations And Additions at each Described Location.
d. You may use all or part of this ordinance or law
coverage to pay for the increased costs you incur to remove debris resulting from the construction, demolition, remodeling, renovation,
repair or replacement of property as stated in a.
above.

e. We do not cover:
(1) The loss in value to any covered building or
other structure due to the requirements of
any ordinance or law; or
(2) The costs to comply with any ordinance or
law which requires you or others to test for,
monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond
to, or assess the effects of, pollutants on
any covered building or other structure.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
This coverage is additional insurance.
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
1. Ordinance or Law is deleted and replaced by the
following:
1. Ordinance Or Law, meaning any ordinance or law:
a. Requiring or regulating the construction, demolition, remodeling, renovation or repair of property, including removal of any resulting debris.
This Exclusion 1.a. in Form DP 00 02, A.1.a. in
Form DP 00 01, and 1.a.(1) in Form DP 00 03,
does not apply to the amount of coverage that
may be provided under Other Coverages,
Glass Or Safety Glazing Material or Ordinance
Or Law;
b. The requirements of which result in a loss in
value to property; or
c. Requiring you or others to test for, monitor,
clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess
the effects of, pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or
thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials
to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
This exclusion applies whether or not the property
has been physically damaged.
(This is Exclusion A.1. in Form DP 00 01 and Exclusion 1.a. in Form DP 00 03.)

\<\
Paae2 of 4

Coovriaht. Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997

DP 01 43 04 98

2. For all forms other than DP 00 01, Earth Movement is deleted and replaced by the following:
2. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake, including
land shock waves or tremors before, during or after a volcanic eruption; landslide; mine subsidence;
mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting; unless direct loss by:
a. Fire; or
b. Explosion;
ensues and then we will pay only for the ensuing

loss.
(This is Exclusion 1.b. in Form DP 00 03.)
4. Power Failure is deleted and replaced by the
following:
4. Power Failure, meaning the failure of power or
other utility service if the failure takes place off the
Described Location. But if the failure of power or
other utility service results in a loss, from a Peril
Insured Against on the Described Location, we will
pay for the loss or damage caused by that Peril Insured Against.
(This is Exclusion 1.d. in Form DP 00 03.)
CONDITIONS
3. Concealment or Fraud is deleted and replaced by
the following:
3. Concealment Or Fraud
With respect to all persons insured under this policy, we provide no coverage for loss if, whether before or after a loss, one or more persons insured
under this policy have:
a. Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any
material fact or circumstance;
b. Engaged in fraudulent conduct; or
c. Made false statements;
relating to this insurance.
Under 4. Your Duties After Loss, Paragraph a. is
deleted and replaced by the following:
a. Give prompt notice to us or our agent. One
means you may use to fulfill this requirement is
mailing the notice to us, postage prepaid,
through first class mail deposited in a United
States Post Office;
Under 4. Your Duties After Loss, the following is
added to Item e.:
One means you may use to send the requested
proof of loss is mailing it to us, postage prepaid, through first class mail deposited in a
United States Post Office.
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Failure to submit the requested proof of loss
within 60 days does not invalidate your claim, if
you show that it was not reasonably possible to
^io so 3tt<i Bteo stow KteK v^u sufevrMted* ttv&
proof of loss to us as soon as reasonably possible.
11. Suit Against Us is deleted and replaced by the
following:
11. Suit Against Us
No action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the action is
started within three years after the date of loss.
13. Loss Payment is deleted and replaced by the
following:
13. Loss Payment
We will adjust all losses with you. We will pay you
unless some other person is named in the policy or
is legally entitled to receive payment. Loss will be
payable within 30 days after we receive your proof
of loss and:
a. Reach an agreement with you;
b. There is an entry of a final judgment; or
c. There is a filing of an appraisal award with us.
17. Cancellation
Paragraph b. is deleted and replaced by the following:
b. We may cancel this policy only for the reasons
stated below by letting you know in writing of
the date cancellation takes effect. The
cancellation notice may be delivered to you or
mailed through first class mail to your last
address known to us.
Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.
(1) When you have not paid the premium, we
may cancel at any time by letting you know
at least 10 days before the date cancellation
takes effect.
(2) When this policy has been in effect for less
than 60 days and is not a renewal with us,
we may cancel for any reason by letting you
know at teast 10 days before the date cancellation takes effect
(3) When this policy has been in effect for 60
days or more, or at any time if it is a renewal
with us, we may cancel if:
(a) There has been a material misrepresentation;
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(b) The risk has changed substantially since
the policy was issued, unless we could
have reasonably foreseen the change or
contemplated the risk in writing the policy; or
(c) There has been a substantial breach of
a contractual duty, condition or warranty.
This can be done by letting you know at
least 30 days before the date cancellation
takes effect.
(4) When this policy is written for a period of
more than one year or for an indefinite term,
we may cancel for any reason at anniversary by letting you know at least 30 days before the date cancellation takes effect.

18. Nonrenewal is deleted and replaced by the following:
18. Nonrenewal
We may elect not to renew this policy. If we elect
not to renew, we will let you know in writing at least
30 days before the expiration date of the policy.
The nonrenewal notice may be delivered to you or
mailed through first class mail to your last address
known to us. Proof of mailing will be sufficient
proof of notice.
All other provisions of this policy apply.
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DWELLING FIRE - UTAH
PERSONAL DWELLING
LIABILITY COVERAGE POLICY
(DLC)

778 E. Winchester Street (6600 South)
PO Box 571310
Murray, Utah 84157-0130

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in
the State of Utah. Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that is provided.
You may call the company to help and assist you in any questions you may have.

The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company and by the
insured named in the Declarations and Policy.

BRM FORM S016 *DLC1 UA DOC* ED 2 03-01
Replaces DLC1-3/92
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PERSONAL DWELLING LIABILITY AGEEMENT
AGREEMENT
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the premium and in compliance with and according
to the provisions of this policy and the declarations, including the limits of liability.

DEFINITIONS
In this policy, "you" and "your" r ^ e r t 0 the "named
insured" shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a
resident of the same household. "We", "us", and "our"
refer to the Company providing this insurance. In
addition, certain words and phrases are defined as
follows:
1.

"Bodily Injury" means bodily harm, sickness
or disease, including required care, loss of
services and death that results.

2.

"Business" means a trade, profession or
occupation, including all farming, ranching,
dairying and agricultural activities, whether full
or part time, by one engaged in any
commercial activity for gain or livelihood,
including employees of their employer,
executives and traveling salesmen.

3. "Motor Vehicle," "auto" or "car" means a
private passenger vehicle, pickup truck, panel
truck or van, truck, tractor, motorcycle, or
similar vehicle which is designed for use on
public roads, including equipment, accessories
and machinery.
4. "Recreational Vehicle" means a selfpropelled land vehicle regardless of the
method of surface conduct, including its trailer
and all parts that are designed or used for
leisure time activities. This includes, but does
not exclude, all-terrain vehicles, motor homes
or similar vehicles, whether or not they have
four wheels or not.
5. Insured" if shown on the declaration as:
a. an "individual," insured means you, and
residents of your household who are your
relatives; and other persons under the age
of 21 in the care of any person named
above;

b.

a "partnership" or a "joint venture," insured
means you, all partners and members and
spouses, but only with respect to their
liability as such;
c. an
"organization"
(other
than
a
"partnership" or a "joint venture)", insured
means the organization and all of its
executive
officers,
directors
or
stockholders, but only with respect to their
liability as such;
d. an organization or a person not including
your employee or employees while acting
as your real estate manager;
e. your legal representative if you die while
this policy is in force and effect and while
your personal representative is acting
within
his/her
legal
duties
and
responsibilities but only with respect to the
property as provided for under this policy
under the definition of insured location.
6.

"Insured Location" means:
a. the dwelling shown in the declarations and
the premises on which the dwelling is
located, and not to exceed four rental units
located thereon;
b. incidental other buildings and structures at
the premises as shown in the Declarations
at the "insured location;"
c. individual or family cemetery plots or burial
vaults of an "insured;"
d. rights of way, easements and roadways for
access to the "insured location."
"Occurrence" means an accident, including
continuous
or
repeated
exposure
to
substantially the same general harmful
conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in:
a. "bodily injury;" or
b. "property damage."

~xi

8. "Property Damage" means physical injury to,
destruction of, or loss of use of tangible
property.
9. "Limits of Liability" means the limit of liability
that applies for the coverage.
10. "Provisions or terms of this Policy" means
all terms, limitations, exclusions, conditions
and limits of liability and definitions of this
coverage.

11. "Declaration page" your personal dwelling
liability coverage page is attached to the policy
with your name, address, the "insured
location", policy period, coverages and the
amount of insurance based upon the premium
paid, and your statements, representations
and declarations.
12. "Declarations" means the Declaration Page.

LIABILITY COVERAGES

Coverage L Bodily Injury or Property Damage

1. to a person on the "insured location" with the
permission of an "insured;" or

We will pay for damages for bodily injury or property
damage for which an "insured" becomes legally
responsible caused by an "occurrence" arising out of
the "insured location" or its incidental operation subject
to the limits of liability. We will:

2. to a person off the "insured location," if the
"bodily injury:"
a. arises out of a condition on the "insured
location" or the ways
immediately
adjoining;
b. is caused by the activities of an "insured"
at the "insured location;"
c. is caused by an animal owned by or in the
care of an "insured" at the "insured
location."

1.

pay up to our limit of liability for the damages
for which the "insured" is legally liable.
Damages
include
prejudgment
interest
awarded against the "insured;"

2.

provide a defense at our expense by counsel
of our choice, even if the suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent. We may investigate and
settle any claim or suit that we decide is
appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends
when the amount we pay for damages
resulting from the "occurrence" equals our limit
of liability.

Coverage M - Medical Payments to Others
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are
incurred or medically ascertained within three years
from the date of an accident causing "bodily injury,"
subject to the limits of liability as provided in the
declarations and the provisions and terms of this
policy. Medical expenses means reasonable charges
for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance,
hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and
funeral services. This coverage does not apply to you
or regular residents of your household. As to others,
this coverage applies only:

Additional Coverages
We cover the following in addition to the limits of
liability:
1. Claim Expenses. We pay:
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed against
an "insured" in any suit we defend;
b. premiums on bonds required in a suit we
defend, but not for bond amounts more
than the limit or liability for Coverage L
We need not apply for or furnish any bond;
c. reasonable expenses incurred by an
"insured" at our request, including actual
loss of earnings (but not loss of other
income) up to $35 per day, for assisting us
in the investigation or defense of a claim or
suit;
d. interest on the entire judgement which
accrues after entry of the judgement and
before we pay or tender, or deposit in
court that part of the judgement which
does not exceed the limit of liability that
applies.
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2.

First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for
first aid to others incurred by an "insured" for
"bodily injury" covered under this policy. We
will not pay for first aid to you or any other
"insured."

3. Damage to Property of Others. We will pay, at
replacement cost, up to $500 per "occurrence"
for "property damage" to property of others
caused by an "insured."
We will not pay for "property damage:"
a. caused intentionally by "insured" who is 13
years of age or older;
b. to property owned by an "insured;"
c. to property owned by or rented to a tenant
of an "insured" or a resident in your
household; or
d. arising out of:
(1) a "business" engaged in by an
"insured;"
(2) any act or omission in connection with
a
premises
owned,
rented or
controlled by an "insured," other than
the "insured location;" or
(3) the ownership, maintenance or use of
aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicles or
all other motorized land conveyances.
EXCLUSIONS
1.

Coverage L - Personal Liability, and Coverage
M - Medical Payments to Others, do not apply
to "bodily injury" or "property damage:"
a. which is expected by, directed by, intended
by or arises out of an act of force by an
"insured." An act of force does not include
the use of reasonable force to protect
persons or property from an act of crime.
b. arising out of or in connection with a
"business" engaged in by an "insured" as
defined in the definitions. This exclusion
applies but is not limited to an act or
omission, regardless of its nature or
circumstance, involving a service or duty
rendered, promised, owed or implied to be
provided because of the nature of the
"business;"
c. arising out of the rendering of or failure to
render professional services;
d. arising out of a premises:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use,
loading or unloading of motor vehicles
or
all
other
motorized
land
conveyances, including trailers, owned
or operated by or rented or loaned to
an "insured;"

(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a
motor vehicle or any other motorized
land conveyance to any person; or;
(3) vicarious liability, whether or not
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a
child or minor using a conveyance
excluded in paragraph (1) or (2)
above;
e. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use,
loading or unloading of a watercraft;
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a
watercraft described below to any
person; or
(3) vicarious liability, whether or not
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a
child or minor using a watercraft.
f. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use
loading of an aircraft;
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of an
aircraft to any person; or
(3) vicarious liability, whether or not
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a
child or minor using a aircraft.
An aircraft means any contrivance used or
designed for flight, except model or hobby
aircraft not used or designed to carry
people or cargo.
g. arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use
loading or unloading of recreational
vehicles and all other recreational land
or conveyances, including trailers
owned, operated, rented or loaned to
an "insured;"
(2) the use of a recreational motor vehicle
in, or in the practice or the preparation
for, racing, speed, pulling or pushing,
demolition or stunt activities or
contests; or
(3) the entrustment to Insured" o1 any
motorized recreational vehicle, or any
other motorized recreational land
conveyance to any person; or
(4) vicarious liability, whether or not
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a
child or minor using a recreational
vehicle or conveyance excluded in
paragraphs 1 and 2.
h. caused directly or indirectly by war,
including undeclared war, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike
act by a military force or military personnel,
destruction or seizure of use for a military
purpose, and including any consequence
of any of these. Discharge of a nuclear

weapon will be deemed a warlike act even
if accidental;
i. which arises out of the transmission of a
communicable disease by an "insured;"
j.
arising out of an "insured" who inflicts, or
directs another person to inflict, upon any
person, corporal punishment or sexual
abuse which results in "bodily injury" or
"property damage." Sexual abuse includes
physical or mental harassment or assault
of a sexual nature;
k. arising out of the use, sale, manufacture,
delivery, transfer or possession by any
person of a Controlled Substance(s) as
defined by the Federal Food and Drug Law
at 21 U.S.CA Sections 811 and 812.
Controlled Substances include but are not
limited to, cocaine, LSD, marijuana and all
narcotic drugs. However, this exclusion
does not apply to the legitimate use of
prescription drugs by a person following
the orders of a licensed physician;
I. arising out of the conduct of a partnership
or a joint venture that is not shown on the
declarations;
m. arising out of work being performed by the
"insured" or on the "insured's" behalf to
change the use of the "insured location" to
other than that of a residence;
n. we do not pay for:
(1) "bodily injury" to an employee of an
"insured" if it occurs in the course of
employment;
(2) consequential injuries to a spouse,
child, parent, brother or sister or such
injured employee.
(3) which is assumed under a contract or
an agreement. This exclusion does
not apply to an incidental contract.
o. arising out of "bodily injury" to a person
caused by lead poisoning.
2.

Coverage L - Personal Liability, does not
apply to:
a. liability:
(1) for any loss assessment charged
against you as a member of an
association, corporation or community
of property owners;
b. "property damage" to property owned by
the "insured;"
c. "property damage" to property rented to,
occupied or used by or in the care of the
"insured;"
d. "bodily injury" to any person eligible to
receive any benefits:
(1) voluntarily provided; or

(2) required to be provided;
by the "insured" under any:
(1) worker's compensation law;
(2) non-occupational disability law; or
(3) occupational disease law.
e. "bodily injury" or "property damage" for
which an "insured" under this policy:
(1) is also an insured under a nuclear
energy liability policy; or
(2) would be an insured under that policy
but for the exhaustion of its limit of
liability.
A nuclear energy liability policy is one
issued by:
(1) American Nuclear Insurers;
(2) Mutual
Atomic
Energy
Liability
Underwriters;
(3) Nuclear Insurance Assn. Of Canada;
or any of their successors.
f. "bodily injury" to you or an "insured" within
the meaning of part a. or b. of "insured" as
defined,
3.

Coverage M - Medical Payments to Others,
does not apply to "bodily injury:"
a. to a "residence employee;"
b. to any person eligible to receive benefits:
(1) voluntarily provided; or
(2) required to be provided:
under any:
(1) worker's compensation law;
(2) non-occupational disability law; or
(3) occupational disease law.
c. from any:
(1) nuclear reaction;
(2) nuclear radiation; or
(3) radioactive contamination;
all whether controlled or uncontrolled or
however caused by; or
(4) any consequence of any of these.
d. to any person, other than a "residence
employee" of an "insured," regularly
residing on any part of the "insured
location."

CONDITIONS
1.

Limit of Liability.
Out total liability under
Coverage L for all damages resulting from any
one "occurrence" will not be more than the limit
of liability for Coverage L as shown in the
Declarations. This limit is the same regardless
of the number of "insured's," claims made or
persons injured.
All "bodily injury" and
"property damage" resulting from any one
accident or from continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general
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harmful conditions shall be considered to be
the result of one "occurrence."

statement to us as soon as reasonably
possible;
e. the "insured"
will not, except at the
"insured's" own cost, voluntarily make
payment, assume obligation or incur
expense other than for first aid to others at
the time of the "bodily injury."

Our total liability under Coverage M for all
medical expense payable for "bodily injury" to
one person as the result of one accident will
not be more than the limit of liability for
Coverage M as shown in the Declarations.
2.

Severability of Insurance.
This insurance
applies separately to each "insured." This
condition will not increase our limit of liability
for any one "occurrence."

3.

Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or
"occurrence," the "insured" will perform the
following duties that apply. You will help us by
seeing that these duties are performed:
a. give written notice to us or our agent as
soon as is practical, which sets forth:
(1) the identity of the policy and "insured;"
(2) reasonably available information on
the time, place and circumstances of
the accident or "occurrence;" and
(3) names and addresses of any
claimants and witnesses;
One means you may use to give written
notice is mailing the notice to us, postage
prepaid, through first class mail deposited
in the United States Post Office.
b. promptly forward to us every notice,
demand, summons or other process
relating to the accident or "occurrence;"
c. at our request, help us;
(1) to make settlement;
(2) to enforce any right or contribution or
indemnity against any person or
organization who may be liable to an
"insured;"
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend
hearings and trials;
(4) to secure and give evidence and
obtain the attendance of witnesses.
d. under the coverage - Damage to Property
of Others - submit to us within 60 days
after the loss, a sworn statement of loss
and show the damaged property, if in the
"insured's" control. One means you may
use to send the statement of loss is
mailing it to us, postage prepaid, through
first class mail deposited in the United
States Post Office. Failure to submit the
statement of loss within 60 days does not
invalidate your claim, if you show that it
was not reasonably possible to do so and
also show that you submitted the

4.

Duties of an Injured Person - Coverage M Medical Payments to Others. The injured
person or someone acting for the injured
person will:
a. give us written proof of claim, under oath if
required, as soon as is practical; and
b. authorize us to obtain copies of medical
reports and records.
The injured person will submit to physical
examination by a doctor of our choice when
and as often as we reasonably require.

5.

Payment of Claim - Coverage M - Medical
Payments to Others.
Payment under this
coverage is not an admission of liability by an
"insured" or us.

6.

Suit Against Us. No action can be brought
unless the policy provisions have been
compiled with and the action is started within
three years after the date of the loss.
No one will have the right to join us as a party
to any action against an "insured." Also, no
action With respect to Coverage L can be
brought against us until the obligation of
"insured" has been determined by final
judgement or agreement signed by us.

7.

Bankruptcy of an "Insured". Bankruptcy or
insolvency of an "insured" will not relieve* us of
our obligations under this policy.

8.

Other Insurance - Coverage L - Personal
Liability. This insurance is excess over other
valid and collectible insurance except
insurance written specifically to cover as
excess over the limits of liability that apply in
this policy.

9.

Policy Period. This policy applies only to
"bodily injury" or "property damage" which
occurs during the policy period.

10. Subrogation.
An "insured" may waive in
writing before a loss all rights of recovery
against any person, if not waived, we may
require an assignment of rights of recovery for
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a loss to the extent that payment is made by
us.
If an assignment is sought, an "insured" must
sign and deliver all related papers and
cooperate with us.
Subrogation does not apply to Medical
Payments to Others or Damage to Property of
Others.
11. Concealment or Fraud. The entire policy will
be void if, whether before or after a loss, an
"insured" has:
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented
any material fact or circumstance;
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or
c. made false statements;
relating to this insurance.
12. Liberalization Clause. If we make a change
which broadens coverage under this edition of
our policy without additional premium charge,
that change will automatically apply to your
insurance as of the date we implement the
change in your state, provided that this
implementation date falls within 60 days prior
to or during the policy period stated in the
Declarations.
13. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A
waiver or change of a provision of this policy
must be in writing by us to be valid. Our
request for an appraisal or examination will not
waive any of our rights.
14. Assignment. Assignment of this policy will not
be valid unless we give our written consent.
15. Death.
If any person named in the
Declarations or the spouse, if a resident of the
same household, dies:
a. we insure the legal representative of the
deceased but only with respect to the
premises and property of the deceased
covered under the policy at the time of
death;
b. "insured" includes:
(1) any member of your household who is
an "insured" at the time of your death,
but only while a resident of the
"residence premises;" and
(2) with respect to your property, the
person having proper temporary
custody
of
the
property
until
appointment and qualification of a
legal representative.

16. Cancellation.
a. You may cancel this policy at any time by
returning it to or by letting us know in
writing of the date cancellation is to take
effect;
b. we may cancel this policy only for the
reasons stated below by letting you know
in writing of the date cancellation takes
effect. The cancellation notice may be
delivered to you or mailed through first
class mail to your last address known to
us. Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof
of notice;
(1) when you have not paid the premium,
we may cancel at any time by letting
you know at least 10 days before the
date cancellation takes effect;
(2) when this policy has been in effect for
less than 60 days and is not a renewal
with us, we may cancel for any reason
by letting you know at least 10 days
before the date cancellation takes
effect;
(3) when this policy has been in effect for
60 days or more, or at any time if it is a
renewal with us, we may cancel if:
(a) there has been a material
misrepresentation; or
(b) the risk has changed substantially
since the policy was issued,
unless we could have reasonably
foreseen
the
change
or
contemplated the risk in writing the
policy; or
(c) there has been a substantial
breach of a contractual duty,
condition or warranty.
(4) when this policy is written for a period
of more than one year or for an
indefinite term, we may cancel for any
reason at anniversary by letting you
know at least 30 days before the date
cancellation takes effect.
c. when this policy is cancelled, the premium
for the period from the date of cancellation
to the expiration date will be refunded prorata;
d. if the return premium is not refunded with
the notice of cancellation or when this
policy is returned to us, we will refund it
within a reasonable time after the date
cancellation takes effect.
17. Non-Renewal. We may elect not to renew this
policy. If we elect not to renew, we will let you
know in writing at least 30 days before the
expiration date of this policy. The non-renewal

notice may be delivered to you or mailed
through first class mail to your last address
known to us. Proof of mailing will be sufficient
proof of notice,
18. Non-duplication of Benefits, Limit of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance.
a. No "insured", or other person, can recover
benefits from the same elements of loss
under this, or any other insurance, for an
occurrence.
b. Policies Issued by us to you:
(1) if two or more insurance policies
issued by us to you apply to the same

occurrence, the total limits of liability
under all such policies shall not
exceed that of the policy with the
highest limit of liability.
Other Liability Coverage Available from
Other Sources:
(1) if other liability coverage applies, we
are liable only for our share of the
damages. Our share is the percent
that the limit of liability of this policy
bears to the total of all liability
coverage applicable to the occurrence.

Includes copyrighted material of Insurance Services Office, with its permission.
Copyright, Insurance Office, Inc. 7/88
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SHAWN D. TURNER (5813)
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B
South Jordan, UT 84095
(801) 446-6464
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY
Plaintiff,

DOCKETING STATEMENT

v.
DAVID WILLIAMS AND DEANNA
WILLIAMS
Defendant

1.

Court of Appeals No. 20050618-CA

This Appeal is from a final Order and Judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City Department Hon.
Lee Dever entered June 13, 2005.

2.

Appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court Pursuant to
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
pursuant to that Court's jurisdiction under UCA §78-2-2.
The case was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to UCA §78-2-2(4).

3.

(a)

Date of Entry of Final Order Appealed From: 6/13/05

(b)

Date Notice of Appeal was filed: 7/13/05

(c) Dates of Post Judgment Motions: N/A
4.

Issues on Appeal
Whether the trial court erred in expanding an exclusion

from coverage for losses

caused by vandalism or malicious

h

i

mischief to include losses from arson contrary to established
case law requiring exclusions in coverage contained in
insurance contracts to be read narrowly.
A. Relevant Case Authority
American States
Ins.
Co. v. Rancho
97 P.3d 775 (Wash App. 2004).
Battishill
v.
App. 2004) .
Draughon
1989).
Farmers
Holbrook

v.

Alliance

CUNA Mutual

Ins.

Insurance
Company

United States
(Utah 1993).
B.

Farmers

Exchange
v.

Fidelity

Insurance

Society,

v.

Adams,

San Marcos

Versaw,

Co.,

Properties,

LLC,

97 P.3d 620 (NM

111 P. 2d 1105 (Utah App.

99 P. 3d 796 (Utah 2004)

542 P.2d 191 (1975)

& Guaranty

Co.,

v.

Sandt,

854 p.2d 519

Applicable Standard of Appellate Review:
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment,

the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable
to the losing party below.

And in determining whether those

facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for
the prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are
reviewed for correctness.
Blue

Cross

& Blue

Shield

v.

State,

5.

Summary of Relevant Facts

779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).

The Williams are the owners of a small rental home located
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the summer of 2002, their last set

of tenants damaged the interior of the home and moved out.

The

damage was to an extent that made it impracticable for the
Williams to rent the property to someone else until substantial
repairs were made to the property.

Unfortunately at this time

Mr. Williams was in Bankruptcy and there was no cash readily
available to make the repairs.

The property has been

unoccupied since these last tenants moved out.
During all of this time the Williams had the property
covered with insurance purchased from Bear River Mutual.

The

Williams faithfully paid their premiums for what they were
informed and perceived was fire insurance on the property.
On July 3, 2003 a fire started in some debris located
outside the back door to the property.

The Salt Lake County

fire inspector and the hired fire inspector for the Plaintiff
have stated their opinion that the fire began in that location
and that the cause of the fire was probably a hand held flame.
The Williams asked Bear River to provide the fire
insurance which they had purchased.

Bear River has refused to

provide the insurance and has instead claimed it owes the
Williams nothing.

The basis for this denial is the two pronged

argument made in Bear River's Memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgement namely 1.) the policies stated
exclusion for losses caused by vandalism or malicious mischief
encompass claims for arson and/or 2.) that the structure was

not used primarily for dwelling purposes.

The parties filed

cross motions for summary judgment on these issues.

The Trial

Court granted Bear River's suiiimary judgment as to the first
reason only and denied Defendants motions.
6.

Prior Appeals N/A
DATED this 18th day of August, 2005
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY L.C.
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Shawn D. Turner
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